1118-1214欧元短线交易贴（附中长期趋势分析判断，本贴将无折扣）

	4849下了空单!!! 美元+石油：分手在即 2007-11-26 [2007.11.22]Time to break free 分手正当此际 The dollar 美元 Time to break free 分手正当此际 Nov 22nd 2007 From The Economist print edition The Middle East's oil exporters should end their currencies' peg to the dollar. 中东石油输出国们应该终止他们与美元挂钩的货币政策了。                                 登录/注册后可看大图 IN THE past week Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has damned it as a “worthless piece of paper” and China's premier, Wen Jiabao, has moaned that it is causing his country “big pressure”. The dollar's relentless decline—it hit a new low of $1.49 against the euro on November 21st—is prompting jibes from America's critics, jangling investors' nerves and giving policymakers headaches. 11月21日，美元创下1欧元兑换1.49美元的新低。上周，伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪·内贾德谴责它是一张无用的废纸，而中国总理***则抱怨说这给他的国家带来了巨大的压力。美元的无情跌势鼓舞了那些美国国内的批评者，刺激着投资者的神经，并让政策制定者们头疼不已。 Nowhere are the dilemmas more acute than in the Gulf, where virtually all the oil-rich states peg their currencies to the greenback. The combination of soaring oil prices and the tumbling dollar is distorting their economies and fuelling inflation. When the Gulf states meet on December 3rd in Qatar, they should agree to loosen their ties to the dollar. 没有地方比海湾国家的窘境更加激烈了。事实上，所有那些富油国家都把他们的货币政策和美元挂钩在一起。飞速上涨的油价与翻跟头的美元扰乱了他们的经济，并使燃油价格开始通胀。海湾国家将于12月3日在卡塔尔召开集会，他们将于会上同意松动他们与美元的紧密联系。 The argument for linking to the greenback was to provide an anchor for the region's economies, many of which are small, open and financially immature. In effect, the Gulf states import America's monetary policy. The trouble is that a fixed currency makes it hard for oil exporters to adjust to swings in the price of oil. And monetary policy in the world's largest oil-importer is not always right for those who sell the stuff. 有争议的是，与美元挂钩是否为该地区经济提供了一个稳定的基准。很多海湾国家的经济体小而开放，且金融发展不够成熟。他们引进美国的货币政策卓有成效。麻烦在于，固定汇率使得石油输出国们很难在油价波动中进行调整。世界上最大的石油进口国的货币政策通常并不适合这些石油出口国。 Soaring oil prices have brought the Gulf Arabs huge riches. Their real exchange rates, as a result, ought to rise. The simplest way to do that is for the currency to strengthen, but the peg prevents nominal appreciation. Worse, the dollar itself has been falling. The result is rising domestic inflation. Some smaller Gulf economies now have inflation rates of around 10%. 飙升的油价给海湾的阿拉伯国家带来了巨大的财富。作为结果，他们的真实汇率应该提升。最简单的办法就是本币升值。但是与美元的挂钩阻止了名义上的增值。更糟糕的是，美元自身正在贬值。其结果就是国内通胀率的上升。某些海湾小国的通胀率已经达到10%左右。 What is to be done? The two most widely discussed options are to revalue or to shift to a currency basket (which Kuwait has already done). By repegging their currencies to the dollar at a higher rate, the Gulf states would alleviate some of today's inflationary pressure. But they would not address the underlying mismatch between any oil exporter and a dollar peg. Switching the peg to a basket of currencies that included, say, the euro and yen as well would give the Gulf states a bit more protection against oil-price swings, but it is hardly a perfect fit. Since most big currencies belong to oil importers, the Gulf States would still be linking their currencies to monetary conditions that may not suit them. 那么该做些什么？有两种可能性被广泛讨论，要么调高本币对美元的汇率，要么转而盯向一篮子货币，就像科威特已经做的那样。以更高的汇率盯住美元，可以缓解一些海湾国家当前的通胀压力。但他们将无法应付任何盯住美元与石油输出者之间的错位可能。而转盯一篮子货币，比如欧元和日元，虽然可以让海湾国家在油价波动中得到一些更多的保护，但也并非尽善尽美。由于大多数货币都属于那些石油进口国家，海湾国家盯住这些货币的政策可能仍将不适合自己。 Eventually, the currency pegs should be abandoned. After all, developed economies that are big commodity exporters, such as Norway, allow their currencies to float. In recent years many emerging economies have shifted from exchange-rate pegs to a “managed float”. Instead of aiming for an exchange rate, their central banks have an inflation target. If the Gulf states move to a single currency, as they plan to in the next few years, that currency should surely float. But floating is not feasible in the short-term. These countries have no history of independent monetary policy and few institutions to conduct it. 最终，所有货币紧盯政策都将被放弃。毕竟那些发达国家经济体都是些庞大的商品出口国，例如挪威，他们允许他们的本币自由浮动。近些年来，新兴经济体们已经从汇率紧盯政策转向可控浮动。这些国家央行的目标，也由控制通胀取代了紧盯某种货币。如果这些海湾国家打算实行单一货币，就像他们在未来几年中计划的那样，那么这种货币也必将是可浮动的。当然，这一货币浮动政策短期内尚不可行。这些国家没有独立制定货币政策的经验，也没有专门的委员会来管理它。 Look beyond a basket 眺望一篮子货币之后 For the moment, the Gulf states are stuck with a currency peg. But they could do better than the dollar. One intriguing idea is to include the oil price as part of a basket that includes the leading currencies (see article). This would ensure their currencies absorbed some of the impact of oil-price swings. 目前，海湾国家仍无法摆脱货币紧盯政策。不过他们可以比仅仅紧盯美元做得更好些。有个好主意，由那些主要通货组成一篮子货币，并加入油价。这样可以确保货币政策可以吸收掉一部分油价波动所带来的冲击。 A big uncertainty is what such a shift would mean for the dollar. In the short term, the effect on the Gulf states' appetite for greenbacks would not be dramatic, since the dollar would have a big weight in any basket. And there should not be a sudden sale of the oil exporters' dollar reserves. The worry is that the end of the Gulf states' dollar peg would send jittery investors into a panic. That risk is real. But with oil prices rising and the dollar falling, the dangers of inaction are greater. The Gulf states need to get rid of their dollar peg now. 有一点无法确定的是，保留多少美元为好。由于在任何一篮子货币组成中，美元都该占到很大的比重，短期内，这些海湾国家对美元的需求不会造成什么戏剧效果。石油输出国们不该抛售他们的美元储备。那些对海湾国家停止紧盯美元的忧虑，将给投资者们带来恐慌。这样的风险的确存在。但是随着油价上涨和美元走低，不作为的风险将越来越大。海湾国家现在该放弃他们的紧盯美元的政策了。

	中国银行业在美经营权：美式胡萝卜 2007-11-20 [2007.11.17]I scratch your back I scratch your back 我也给你搔背(你给我好处，我也不亏待你)（you scratch `my back and ,I'll scratch `yours (saying 谚)） Nov 15th 2007 | HONG KONG From The Economist print edition By inviting in a Chinese bank, America hopes for reciprocity 美国希望借放宽对中国银行业在美经营权的限制来达成互惠 全文意译：【长久以来，西方一直在不懈努力让银行可以前往亚洲投资。但似乎他们的努力并没有收到明显的效果。面对亚洲银行业进入西方的种种限制，亚洲不断抱怨，西方对亚洲银行并没有首先打开门户、降低标准，做出一定的让步，让他们顺利进入西方市场。 作为刚刚起步而迅猛发展的金融大国，中国的银行进入美国市场的道路举步维艰。美国对银行业的监管事无巨细、极其严格。1982年，中国银行在美国纽约开设了第一家分行。1989年，交通银行成为第二个在美开设分行的金融机构。这两家银行都是在1991年美国采取更严格的外资银行监管法之前在纽约设立分行。相隔18年之久，招商银行终于得偿所愿，于2007年11月9日成为第三个获准进入美国市场的中国银行。行长马蔚华感慨的说：“这真是一个让人骄傲的时刻。获得美国银行经营执照，是对中国的银行达到世界上银行业监管标准的一个认可”。事实上，美国批准中国的银行进入美国市场只不过是一种“信任的表示”和政治上的考量罢了。他们的真正目的是为美国银行在华投资的道路上扫除障碍。尤其是为那些在证券交易处于主导地位的大公司能够顺利进入中国市场做好铺垫。 美国不愿向外来银行发放经营许可是事出有因的。1991年国际商业信贷银行的崩溃，不得不让美国再三考虑对外开放银行进入的标准。他们担心，如果对外资银行业的监管不慎重、不严格，洗钱和恐怖主义融资则会日益猖獗。同时，中国的顺利进入也会增大风险，给美政治导向的银行贷款带来巨大损失。 尽管美国对外来银行投资进行了种种限制，但美联储对招商银行的获准却给大批跃跃欲试的中国银行带来了希望。工商银行和建设银行已经向美联储递交了申请，直到现在还没有得到正式批准。一直以来，所有中国的银行在境外投资所得收入都星星落落、不甚理想。虽然在纽约设立分行可以为它们提供进入世界金融体系中心的桥头堡，但是中国并没有在进军世界金融业的道路上止步不前。就在过去的一年当中，中国掀起了一场投资风暴，工商银行收购了印尼哈廉国有银行大部分股份、收购澳门诚兴银行和收购南非标准银行，都显示了中国面对国际性大银行的全面竞争和巨大压力不畏艰难的意志和决心。很显然，工商银行以及其它大银行并不认为，美国对银行监管标准的认可是中国开拓国际银行市场的唯一希望。 银行危机自从在西方爆发以来，让西方国家突然发现地平线上的一道曙光。中国股市的暴涨，使得中国的银行业走向低迷。西方国家抓住了这个契机，通过对中国诸多银行的少数控股赚取了一笔不小的财富。而理论上来看，众多中国的银行似乎有能力收购象花旗和汇丰这样的国际性大银行。但是中国大部分银行的盈利表现仍然疲弱，现状令人堪忧。实际上，他们仅仅能用其薄弱资产买断一个西方银行的总资产的10%而已。 一位银行家说：中国的银行充斥着流动资金；而西方银行却因为信贷紧缩在这方面表现欠佳。表面上，中国的银行并购外资银行是顺应实际情况、符合商业逻辑。然而，建立一个流通管道为这些资金寻找一个出路就不那么容易了。文化壁垒是巨大而不可轻易逾越的，更何况国外的规制者只对中国的银行打开了一扇窗户，并非是全面敞开门户！】 英文全文分段直译： WESTERN politicians have been banging on Asia's door demanding greater access for their banks for so long that their fists must hurt. Increasingly, however, Asians are answering back, with some justification, “What about letting our banks operate in the West?” 直译：【西方政治家们一直想敲开亚洲的金融大门，要求他们给予外来银行更多的机会，得以进入亚洲市场。时间久了，他们用来敲门的拳头一定伤的不轻。而亚洲据理力争对他们的回答是，“让我们的银行也在西方市场经营，如何呢？”】 On November 9th, a quarter of a century after the Bank of China became the first Chinese bank to win permission to open a branch in New York, and 18 years after Bank of Communications became the second, China Merchants Bank, the country's sixth-largest bank, became the third. It was a proud moment. Its president, Ma Weihua, said that the branch licence was an acknowledgment that Chinese banks now met global regulatory standards. In fact, the approval was as much an act of faith and of political calculation as a full endorsement. With this action, American officials hope that, in turn, restrictions on foreign firms doing business in China will be relaxed, especially those that hold sway over securities trading. 直译：【2007年11月9日，也就是中国银行在纽约设立第一家分行后的25年以后，交通银行开办第二家分行的18年以后，中国第六大的招商银行成为了第三家获准进入美国市场的中国银行。这真是一个值得骄傲的时刻。招商银行行长马蔚华说，“获得美国银行经营执照，是对中国的银行达到世界上银行业监管标准的一个认可”。事实上，美国除了对中国的银行给予一个全面的认可之外，同意开设分行只不过是一种‘相信的表示’和政治计算罢了。通过这个举措他们希望可以得到一些相应的回报------放宽外资银行在中国投资的种种限制，特别是那些在证券交易处于主导地位的大公司。】 America's reluctance to grant licences to foreign banks stemmed from the implosion of Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 1991. It increased with concerns over money laundering and terrorist finance. Chinese banks were a particular cause of worry because of the risk of losses from politically directed loans. 直译：【由于1991年国际商业信贷银行的崩溃，美国不愿向外来银行发放经营许可。因为这会加剧美国对洗钱和恐怖主义融资的担心。中国的银行尤其是让美国担心的一个原因，因为这会增大风险，给美国政治导向的银行贷款带来损失。】 But now that China Merchants is in, several more hope to follow. The two biggest, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and China Construction Bank, have applications pending at the Federal Reserve. For all Chinese banks, earnings outside mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau are trivial. But in the past year there have been a flurry of investments, including big stakes by ICBC in Bank Halim Indonesia, Seng Heng Bank of Macau, and South Africa's Standard Bank. ICBC will not be the only Chinese bank to think that an American regulatory endorsement could be a step towards bigger things. 直译：【但是现在，招商银行给其它银行带来了更多的希望去效仿跟进。中国两家最大的银行，工商银行和建设银行已经向美联储递交了申请，现在还没有得到正式批准。所有的中国银行在大陆，香港，澳门境外的一切投资所得收入都星星落落，不甚理想。但就在去年，中国掀起了一场投资风暴，其中包括工商银行收购印尼哈廉国有银行大部分股份、收购澳门诚兴银行、还有收购南非标准银行。得到美国的经营许可权对中国的银行发展就是向前一小步，跨越了一大步。但象中国的一些其它银行一样，工商银行并没有这样认为。】 Bigger things have, all of a sudden, begun appearing on the horizon since a banking crisis erupted in the West. Over the past two years Western banks have made fortunes on minority investments in Chinese banks. Thanks to a stockmarket boom in China, its banks are now in a position to do the reverse. Theoretically, the biggest Chinese banks could buy Citigroup or HSBC. More realistically, they might purchase say 10% of a Western bank with weak assets. 直译：【银行危机自从在西方爆发以来，让西方国家突然发现了地平线上的一道曙光。过去两年里，西方国家的银行通过对中国的银行少数控股而赚取了一大笔财富。因为中国股市的繁荣，中国的银行业正走向低靡。理论上，众多中国的大银行是可以收购花旗或者汇丰。但更实际一点说，他们仅仅可以用其薄弱资产买断一个西方银行的总资产的10%而已。】 Such a move would have a sound business logic, says a banker: Chinese banks are awash with liquidity; Western banks, thanks to the credit crunch, are short of it. Building a pipeline for the money to follow is not easy, however. Cultural barriers are huge, and non-Chinese regulators are opening a window to Chinese banks, not a door. 直译：【表面上，这种并购举措有一个正确的商业逻辑，一个银行家说：中国的银行充斥着流动资金；而西方银行却因为信贷紧缩在这方面表现欠佳。然而，建立一个流通管道为这些资金寻找一个出路就不那么容易了。文化壁垒是巨大而不可轻易逾越的，更何况国外的规制者只对中国的银行打开了一扇窗户，并非是全面敞开门户！】

	A股目前仍然在调整过程中，指数下破4968不是一个好消息。说实话，就技术上来说，如果再破4800点，短线将非常看空，有向4320附近下滑的可能。日线的指标已经严重地超卖，有回调迹象，4800点称为关键的支撑。目前最近的强阻力在5380-5451之间。短线，我仍然看空为主，回调很难超越5373。今天成交量非常低只有大约522亿，也是下跌可能要短暂终止的信号，股价明日有望一波反弹~ 短中线，可以在指数4320之上开始建仓，主攻能源，农业，奥运题材和金融。蓝筹也可以是目标。

	4845空单成交

	美国经济可能衰退 2007-11-20 [2007.11.15]America's vulnerable economy Recession in America America's vulnerable economy 脆弱的美国经济 Nov 15th 2007 From The Economist print edition                                 登录/注册后可看大图 Recession in America looks increasingly likely. Can booming emerging markets save the world economy? 美国衰退可能性增大。繁荣的新兴经济市场能否挽救世界经济？ IN 1929, days after the stockmarket crash, the Harvard Economic Society reassured its subscribers: “A severe depression is outside the range of probability”. In a survey in March 2001, 95% of American economists said there would not be a recession, even though one had already started. Today, most economists do not forecast a recession in America, but the profession's pitiful forecasting record offers little comfort. Our latest assessment (see article) suggests that the United States may well be heading for recession. 1929年的美国股市崩溃之后，哈佛经济学社给它的赞助者打了一剂定心剂：“发生经济大萧条的可能性微乎其微。”2001年3月的一份调查显示，95%的美国经济学家认为经济不会衰退，即便衰退已经开始。现在，大多数的经济学家预测美国不存在经济衰退。但因为他们乏善可陈的预测成绩，人们并没有感到安心。我们最新的评估显示，美国经济正走向衰退。 Granted, GDP grew by a robust 3.9%, at an annual rate, in the third quarter. Granted also, revisions may well push this figure up. But that was the past. More timely signs suggest that the economy could stall in this quarter. By early next year, output and jobs could be shrinking. The main cause is the imploding housing market. Experts said that house prices could never fall nationwide. But fall they have, by 5% in the past 12 months. Residential investment has collapsed, but a glut of unsold homes means that prices have much further to drop. Americans' spending is likely to be dented much more by a fall in house prices than it was in 2001 by the stockmarket's collapse. With house prices lower and credit conditions tighter as a result of the subprime crisis, households can no longer borrow against capital gains to support their spending. 诚然，美国第三季度的经济增长率高达3.9%，而且，修正后的增长率可能更高。但那已经过去了。很多即期数据显示，美国经济可能会在这个季度熄火。急转直下的房地产市场，可能会导致下年年初产出和工作机会的收缩。虽然专家们说过不会出现全国性范围的房价下跌，但在过去12个月房价已经下跌了5%。房产投资已经崩溃了，大批买不出去的商品房意味着住房价格会继续下跌。由于住房价格的下跌，美国国内支出与股市跳水的2001年相比要少得多。次贷危机让房产价格进一步下降,让信贷环境更加恶劣,那些房东再也不能借到用于支出的资金。 Dearer oil is set to squeeze households further (this week's drop in crude prices notwithstanding). Consumer confidence has already fallen sharply. It cannot be long before consumer spending stumbles, which in turn would hurt companies' profits and investment. The weak dollar will boost exports, but at only 12% of GDP, exports are too small to make up for a weakening of consumer spending, which accounts for 70%. 昂贵的石油让居民的手头更紧，虽然这个星期原油价格有一定下降。消费者信心已经急剧下，消费的大幅下降为时不远了。这种下降反过来会损害企业的利润和投资。弱势美元能增加出口，但仅占GDP12%的出口并不足以抵消占GDP70%的消费支出的弱化。 I want to break free 自由贸易的迷思 Will an American recession drag the rest of the world down with it? The economies of Europe and Japan rebounded strongly in the third quarter, but look likely to slow down. Although both should be able to keep chugging along, neither is likely to set any great pace. Strengthening currencies will hurt exporters in both places. Europe's own housing hotspots are cooling, and some of its banks have been sideswiped by America's subprime ills. 美国经济衰退是否会拖累整个世界？虽然第三季度，欧洲和日本的经济强劲反弹，但看起来很可能趋缓。虽然两者都能稳步前进，但却不能保持一致步骤。欧元和日元汇率的上升会损害他们的出口。欧洲的房产热点正在冷却，而且一些银行在美国次贷危机中遭受波及。 The best hope that global growth can stay strong lies instead with emerging economies. A decade ago, the thought that so much depended on these crisis-prone places would have been terrifying. Yet thanks largely to economic reforms, their annual growth rate has surged to around 7%. This year they will contribute half of the globe's GDP growth, measured at market exchange rates, over three times as much as America. In the past, emerging economies have often needed bailing out by the rich world. This time they could be the rescuers. 现在只能期望，新兴经济体能让世界经济保持强劲增长。要是在十年前，这种认为世界经济必须依赖这些容易爆发危机的地区的想法，能让人不寒而栗。得益于经济的重组，新兴经济的经济增长率达到7%。以市场汇率计算，他们将贡献今年世界经济的一半增长，是美国的3倍之多。在过年，新兴经济经常需要世界的救济。这次，他们充当了一次救世主。 Of course, a recession in America would reduce emerging economies' exports, but they are less vulnerable than they used to be. America's importance as an engine of global growth has been exaggerated. Since 2000 its share of world imports has dropped from 19% to 14%. Its vast current-account deficit has started to shrink, meaning that America is no longer pulling along the rest of the world. Yet growth in emerging economies has quickened, partly thanks to demand at home. In the first half of this year the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in China and India added more to global GDP growth than that in America. 当然，新兴经济的出口会因美国的衰退而减少，但他们已经没有以前那么脆弱了。美国进口做为世界经济增长发动机的作用被过分夸大。到2000年，美国进口在世界进口所占的份额从19%下降到14%。经常性帐户赤字余额开始缩减，意味美国不再是世界经济的拉动者。新兴经济的加速增长，一部分要归功于国内需求。中国和印度今年前半年消费者支出的增长（以美元计）对全球GDP增长的贡献更甚于美国。 Most emerging economies are in healthier shape than ever (see article). They are no longer financially dependent on the rest of the world, but have large foreign-exchange reserves—no less than three-quarters of the global total. Though there are some notable exceptions, most of them have small budget deficits (another change from the past), so they can boost spending to offset weaker exports if need be. 大部分新兴经济体的增长要比以前更健康。他们不再依靠外部资金，相反拥有大量的外汇储备——不少于世界外汇储备总量的四分之三。虽然存在一些例外，更多的新兴经济体只有很少的预算赤字（另一个变化），因此他们能以增加支出的方式去抵消出口减少带来的不利影响。 This does not mean emerging economies will grow fast enough to make up for the whole of a fall in America's output. Most of them will slow a bit next year: for instance, China's growth rate may dip to “only” 10%. So global growth will ease—which, after five years at an average of almost 5%, close to its fastest pace ever, it needs to do. But thanks to the vigour of the new titans, it will stay above its 30-year average of 3.5%. 但这并不意味，新兴经济的增长能够快到消除美国产出下降带来的后果。大部分新兴经济下年的增长将会减缓：比如，中国的增长率可能下降到“只有”10%。所以，在经历了5年年均5%——接近历史最高水平——的增长之后，全球经济增长将会降温，这也是必须的。但得益于新经济巨人的活力，世界经济的增长率仍会高于3.5%这个30年年均增长率。 A tale of two prices 价格背后的故事 The rising importance of the world's new giants will not only boost growth. It will also shift relative prices, notably those of oil and the dollar. And the consequences of this will be less comfortable for developed countries, especially America. 日益重要的世界大事并不仅仅是如何促进经济增长，还有如何以相对价格标示石油和美元。对发达国家，尤其是美国来说，这件事更加紧迫。 The oil price has risen mainly because of strong demand in emerging economies, which have accounted for as much as four-fifths of the total increase in oil consumption in the past five years. In past American recessions the oil price usually fell. This time it is likely to hold up. That will not only hurt the finances of Western consumers, but may also make the jobs of their central bankers harder, by combining inflationary pressure with economic slowdown. 石油价格的上涨，主要是因为新兴经济体的强劲需求。过去5年中，石油消费增长中的五分之四来自新兴经济体。以前美国的衰退会造成油价的应声下跌。这次油价却居高不下，不但损害了西方消费者的财政，而且和通胀一道，让央行的工作更为棘手。 The enfeebled dollar—lately in sight of $1.50 to the euro—would be weaker still without enormous purchases by central banks in emerging economies. This support is now waning. China and others are putting a smaller share of increases in reserves into the American currency. And Asian and Middle Eastern countries with currencies linked to the dollar are facing rising inflation, but falling American interest rates make it harder to tighten their own monetary policy. They may have to let their currencies rise against the sickly greenback, meaning they will need to buy fewer dollars. More important, as international investors wake up to the relative weakening of America's economic power, they will surely question why they hold the bulk of their wealth in dollars. The dollar's decline already amounts to the biggest default in history, having wiped far more off the value of foreigners' assets than any emerging market has ever done. 如果新兴经济体的央行不大量买进美元的话，本来就虚弱的美元——1欧元兑1.5美元——可能会更加弱势。他们的支持是苍白乏力的。中国和其他国家的央行投入美元的外汇储备越来越少。那些货币和美元挂购的亚洲和中东国家正面临不断上升的通货膨胀，持续下跌的美元利率又让他们更难以收紧货币政策。因此，他们不得不让他们的货币保持对疲弱美元的升值。这就意味着他们只需要购买比以前少的美元。更要命的是，国际投资者意识到美国经济的相对虚弱，他们当然会问为什么他们要持有大量的美元资产。美元下跌已经接近历史低点，由此被抹去的外国资产比新兴经济体创造的资产还要多。 The vigour of emerging economies is good news for the world economy: for its growth, it has much less need of a strong America. The bad news for America is that this, in turn, may mean that the world also has less need of the dollar. 新兴经济体的活力对世界经济而言是个好消息：它的增长，可以更少地依靠强劲的美国经济。对美国而言，这种改变却是个坏消息，因为这意味世界对美元的需求也减少了。

	美国银行:资本的惩罚 2007-11-15 [2007.11.08]Banks: Captal punishment Banks银行 Capital punishment资本的惩罚 Nov 8th 2007 From The Economist print edition American banks need to do more than let a few heads roll 对美国银行业来说，光炒鱿鱼是不够的                                 登录/注册后可看大图 SINCE the barbaric “breaking wheel” was replaced by the guillotine in 18th-century France, methods of execution have increasingly sought to end life speedily rather than inflict long agony. There can, however, be few decapitations less painful than those at big American banks. On November 4th Chuck Prince left the boss's office at Citigroup, the world's largest bank, with the “tremendous support and respect” of the board ringing in his ears, even though the firm had to write down $8 billion-11 billion in October alone (see article). A week earlier, Stan O'Neal lost his job at Merrill Lynch after leading the investment bank to a loss with $8.4 billion of write-downs. He too entered retirement not on a tumbril but in a limousine, with $160m to soothe his discomfort. 自从18世纪法国人用断头台代替了野蛮的“碎肉轮”以后，死刑就不再是一种长时间的痛苦折磨。但再爽快的死刑也不如美国大银行的斩首行动潇洒。11月4 日，世界最大银行花旗集团的主席查克·普林斯因为在10月份遭受80亿-110亿美元的损失而被迫辞职，尽管如此，董事会仍对他致以“强有力的支持和崇高的敬意”。在普林斯去职之前一星期，美林解除了斯坦·奥尼尔的职务，原因是他造成了该投资银行84亿美元的损失。美林为此付给奥尼尔1.6亿美元补偿金，所以在退休之后他大可以开豪华轿车而不是拖拉机。 However churlish you may feel about Wall Street's new axiom—“the higher they fly, the bigger the parachute”—the departure of two of America's most senior bankers in a week is a good sign. Accountability, after all, is a step towards clarity, and there are few more coveted resources in today's fog-strewn and stormy banking industry. Both departures were accompanied by revelations of much steeper losses from American subprime mortgages than either Citi or Merrill had owned up to just weeks before. That attempt at honesty may have spooked the market because it showed how unsure the banks remain about how to value their subprime-related assets, but that is no reason to shy away from such disclosures. 华尔街有句新格言：“飞得越高，降落伞就越大”，也许你对这句话感到愤愤不平，不过两位美国最顶级银行家的去职的确是个好消息。无论如何，有人负责总归有益于增进透明度。无法想像人们还能指望别的什么——动荡不堪的银行业现在犹如雾里看花。两大银行掌门人的去职都伴随着美国次级抵押贷款的巨额损失——大大超过了几个星期前的规模。这种勇于认错的诚实行为可能引起市场恐慌，因为这表明银行根本不知道怎样对自己次级贷款相关资产进行估值。但自我揭发总比藏着掖着要好得多。 One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet. 对世界各地的银行和管理层来说，后泡沫时代的日本是一个不可忽视的痛苦教训。在1990年代，日本大银行的高层不仅拒不离职，甚至拒绝对不良债务进行识别和剥离，导致“僵化”贷款一直留在资产负债表上。这是日本经济长期停滞不前的原因之一。银行应该尽快识别损失，抛售手中那些价格永无翻身之日的资产，并为其客户充当这些资产的做市商。行动得越迅速，银行系统的重新崛起就越快。 Understanding your debts  理解债务 Coming clean will be difficult, because for the time being the disclosures have provided more questions than answers. First, just how much do banks stand to lose? The latest confessions show that a whole new constellation of credit instruments, known as collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs), are far less secure than had been assumed even at the end of September. These include supposedly impregnable “super-senior” and AAA-rated tranches of CDOs that a short time ago were prized by the world's banks, insurance companies and mutual funds. In some cases their values have shrunk to a sliver of their original price since a series of downgrades by rating agencies last month. Citi, one of the biggest issuers of such CDOs, estimated this week that the losses on CDOs and other assets at other banks could reach $64 billion—to which its own potential write-downs must be added. Others estimate that overall losses linked to subprime could exceed $200 billion. 完全弄清真相任重道远，因为随着时间的流逝，信息披露与其说是解决问题的方法，不如说是问题来源。首先，银行到底面临着多大的损失？最近的信息披露表明，全新的信用工具抵押债权凭证（CDOs）并不像先前估计的那么牢靠，甚至还不如九月底的情况。不久前某些抵押债权凭证还被各大银行、保险公司和共同基金誉为“顶级”，给予AAA评级，认为它们永远不会垮掉。但随着评级机构在上个月一再降低了某些抵押债权凭证的级别，现在它们的价值已经跌倒初始价格的几分之一。据抵押债权凭证最大发行者之一的花旗集团估计，光是在抵押债权凭证以及其他银行的其他资产上的损失就可能达到640亿美元，这还不包括花旗自己的潜在损失。还有人估计与次级贷款相关的损失将超过2000亿美元。 Second, do banks have enough capital to survive the crisis? At some institutions, mounting losses are making the cushions of capital held for times of crisis look increasingly threadbare. Wall Street firms and European banks use a special accounting provision for securities they consider hardest to value, which appears mainly to involve educated guesswork. On Wall Street the amount of securities in this category has ballooned and could easily wipe out the big firms' core capital if they were written down to zero—which is improbable but no longer thought impossible. To make matters worse, bond insurers, which rate America's $2.5 trillion municipal-bond market, are also up to their necks in CDOs. They were told this week that they might lose their coveted AAA ratings unless their shareholders provide more capital, which would cast a cloud over municipal bonds. 其次，银行到底有没有足够的资本来应对此次危机？对某些机构来说，越积越多的损失使它们为市场危机准备的缓冲资本变得不堪一击。华尔街和欧洲银行采用特别的会计账目来记录它们认为最难估值的证券，估值方法通常仅仅是基于经验的猜测。目前在华尔街，这类证券浩如烟海，如果它们的价值被减计为零，那么华尔街大公司的核心资本将会立马蒸发殆尽。发生这种情况的可能性较小，但绝非不可能。雪上加霜的是，债券保险人也在抵押债权凭证中泥足深陷，而它们还担当着为价值 25000亿美元的美国市政债券市场进行评级的重任。本周这些债券保险人被告知，要想维持它们所希望的AAA评级，就必须让其股东注入更多资本，这无疑为市政债券蒙上了一层阴影。 Third, how hard might the broader economy be hit? The flimsier the banks' capital base, the less freely they can lend to firms and households, putting both consumer spending and corporate investment at risk. Already there is evidence that credit conditions are tightening well beyond the housing market. A survey this week found that American banks have been tightening lending standards on everything from mortgages to commercial property to business and industrial loans. In Europe too, credit conditions have tightened. In Britain the withdrawal of a bid for J. Sainsbury, a supermarket chain, by a Qatari-backed investment group was the latest sign that life has almost been squeezed out of the buy-out business. 第三，在更广层面上，经济将经受多大的冲击？资本基础越薄弱，银行进行商业和房地产借贷就越受束缚，从而消费者支出和企业投资的风险就越大。有迹象表明信贷紧缩的情况已经远远超出了房地产市场的范围。本周的一项调查显示美国银行已经全面收紧了贷款标准，从抵押贷款到商业地产贷款到产业贷款，莫不如是。欧洲的信贷情况也全面收紧。最近一家卡塔尔财团退出了对英国连锁超市森百利的竞标，这表明收购业务的好日子已经一去不复返了。 Batman and Rubin   蝙蝠侠和鲁宾 So what is to be done? The main task is to restore honesty, clarity and credibility as quickly as possible. Citi has turned to Robert Rubin, a former American treasury secretary once dubbed a member of “The Committee to Save the World”, to become chairman. Mr Rubin's star is a little tarnished now—he had advised Mr Prince since the latter became chief executive in 2003. The temptation for Mr Rubin and others will be to hold back from revealing the full extent of the banks' exposures to CDOs, subprime mortgages and other wilting assets. After all, there is no benefit in banking to be the first bearer of bad news, and many chief executives will be justifiably nervous of following the same route as Messrs Prince and O'Neal. 那么人们能够做什么呢？当务之急是尽快重建诚信、透明度和信用。头顶“拯救世界委员会成员”光环的前美国财长罗伯特·鲁宾被花旗任命为新主席。不过其头上的光环可没有从前那么闪亮了——他从2003年普林斯出任花旗首席执行官开始就为后者出谋划策。鲁宾和其他银行家应该顶住诱惑，全面而如实地向公众披露银行在抵押债权凭证、次级抵押贷款和其他缩水资产上的风险敞口。对银行业来说，老是曝出坏消息绝非好事，而银行的首席执行官也断然不愿意步普林斯和奥尼尔之后尘。 But if the banks do not come clean, regulators should push them. Auditors will apply pressure when the banks produce year-end reports. Meanwhile, those who would be screaming down a megaphone for full disclosure if the problem banks were Argentine or Brazilian should apply the same discipline closer to home. 但如果银行老是虚与委蛇，那么管理层就应该介入。审计机构应该在银行发布年报时对其施压。同时，那些每当阿根廷或巴西的银行一出现问题就聒噪个不停的家伙应该对本土银行一视同仁。 The risk is that, as in Japan, tinkering will be easier than acting decisively. The incentives to continue pussyfooting are clear. Undue haste could cause panic. And it is comforting to believe that everything will work out all right in the end, especially if the Federal Reserve keeps cutting rates at every whiff of trouble. The higher oil and food prices go, however, the harder it will be for the Fed to respond so generously. The longer the wait, the harder the economy may fall. 和日本的情况一样，困难在于小修小补总要比大刀阔斧的改革容易得多。谨小慎微的好处是显而易见的：欲速则不达。相信最后一切都会好起来也是顺理成章之事，在美联储一有风吹草动就进行降息之时尤为如此。但随着原油和食品价格的节节攀升，美联储在升息的问题上越来越需要三思而后行。等得越久，对经济的不利影响就越大。

	这个月底不知道美国会不会降息

	我今天750空英镑都挂中了。因为后来决定留着资金跟虎版做欧元，所以盈利10点就跑了。

	3仓空欧。出门办事去了。一直要到晚上才回来。 但愿有好结果！

	恩师。。一小时以上了，还是没破4845。。是否价格要反复？空单风险增加？没